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BRIEFLY NOTED
The Proposition: Sexual Harassment as a
Violation of Title VII
In 1972, Sandra Bundy began to experience sexual intimida-
tion and harassment while working at the District of Columbia De-
partment of Corrections.1 The trouble started when she received
and rejected sexual propositions from a fellow employee, who later
became her department director. Two years later, two of her im-
mediate supervisors, responsible for recommending her for promo-
tion, repeatedly propositioned her, to no avail.' When Bundy
thereafter became eligible for promotion, her supervisors did not
promote her. She complained to a higher level supervisor, but he
casually dismissed her complaint, telling her that "any man in his
right mind would want to rape" her.8 Sandra Bundy subsequently
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia after fully exhausting her administrative reme-
dies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' She sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that her employer vio-
lated Title VII merely by subjecting her to sexual harassment. She
also asked for back pay for the employer's failure to promote her
when she became eligible, alleging that the reason for the delay in
her promotion was her refusal to grant her supervisors any sexual
favors. The district court denied relief, finding that sexual proposi-
tions did not constitute discrimination based on sex, and that
Bundy's employer had legitimate business reasons for not promot-
ing her.' On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed, remanded the question of
1. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
2. One supervisor continually bothered Bundy by calling her into his office to request
that she spend the afternoons with him at his apartment and to question her about her
sexual tastes. The second supervisor also made sexual advances to Bundy, asking her "to
join him at a motel and on a trip to the Bahamas." Id. at 940.
3. Id.
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-15 (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
5. 641 F.2d at 938-39, 941. Although Bundy was eligible for promotion in 1975, she did
not receive a promotion until after commencing the Title VII action. Id. at 939 n.1.
6. Id. at 939.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the denial of Ms. Bundy's back pay, and concluded that when an
employee like Sandra Bundy establishes a prima facie case of sex-
ual harassment and a failure to promote when there is technical
eligibility, the employer then must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that there was a legitimate business reason for not pro-
moting the employee. The court of appeals also remanded the
case for injunctive relief, holding that sexual harassment of a fe-
male employee by her supervisors, even if her resistance does not
result in a loss of tangible job benefits, constitutes sexual discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
The concept that an employer may discriminate against a fe-
male employee by sexually harassing her is not a novel one. Four
years before the Bundy decision, the same court of appeals paved
the way for this holding in Barnes v. Costle,' in which a female
employee alleged that her job at a government agency was abol-
ished in retaliation for her rejection of her male supervisor's sexual
advances. The lower court in Barnes, like the one in Bundy, held
that the employee did not have a Title VII claim. She had suffered
discrimination "not because she was a woman, but because she re-
fused to engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor."10 Barnes
had lost her job not because of gender alone, but because of a per-
sonal relationship. The court of appeals reversed the summary
judgment for the employer and held that an employer who abol-
ishes a female employee's job in retaliation for her resisting sexual
advances violates Title VII.
Although the court in Barnes established a Title VII claim for
sexual harassment resulting in the loss of a tangible job benefit, it
did not answer the question whether sexual harassment, standing
alone, constitutes sexual discrimination. The Bundy court ad-
dressed this "novel question"1 and answered it affirmatively,
based on the provision of Title VII stating that employers act ille-
gally when they discriminate "with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's ...sex."" The court could have concluded that the failure
to promote Bundy was closely enough linked to her sexual harass-
7. Id. at 953.
8. Id. at 948.
9. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
10. Barnes v. Train, Civ. No. 1828-73 (D.D.C.) (order of Aug. 9, 1974), quoted in Barnes
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 641 F.2d at 940.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
[Vol. 35:371
BRIEFLY NOTED
ment to relate to "privileges" of employment, but it did not.18 In-
stead, the court pinned its finding of discrimination on an expan-
sive reading of "conditions of employment" to include the
employee's psychological and emotional work environment." This
concept recognizes that sexually stereotyped insults and humiliat-
ing propositions directed to a female employee may cause her se-
vere anxiety and debilitation. In Sandra Bundy's case, sexual har-
assment permeated her working environment even though it did
not result in the loss of her job. In granting her request for injunc-
tive relief, the court did not tread lightly; it carved out a new cate-
gory of Title VII rights.
To justify its seemingly radical expansion of these rights, the
court of appeals in Bundy based its interpretation of Title VII
guarantees on determinations by the Equal Opportunity Employ-
ment Commission (EEOC) and on cases in several circuits, con-
cluding that the statute guarantees an employee a working envi-
ronment free of discrimination. 1 The court especially noted that
the Fifth Circuit, in Rogers v. EEOC,1 had adopted an expansive
concept of discrimination that envisioned a working environment
"so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely
the emotional and psychological stability of minority group work-
ers." 7 In Rogers, an Hispanic employee claimed that by requiring
her to serve only Hispanic clients, her employer created a discrimi-
natory and offensive work environment. The Title VII principle
enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in Rogers treats an employee's psy-
chological state as an intangible fringe benefit statutorily entitled
to protection from employer abuse. 8 The Rogers court recognized
that employment discrimination is a "complex and pervasive phe-
nomenon, as nuances and subtleties of discriminatory employment
practices are no longer confined to bread and butter issues ' ' 9 such
as hiring, firing, and promoting.
The court of appeals in Bundy built upon the concept of a
discriminatory environment and incorporated sexual harassment
into a judicial framework that had already extended protection
13. The court of appeals in Bundy noted that the record contained evidence that
Bundy's supervisors "at least created the impression that they were impeding her promotion
because she had offended them ... " 641 F.2d at 940.
14. Id. at 945-46.
15. Id. at 945 n.10.
16. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
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against ethnic and racial discrimination. Previously, courts had im-
posed liability for harm to employees caused by ethnic discrimina-
tion against a company's minority clients,2 0 and racial slurs di-
rected at individuals.2 1 Analogizing to these cases, the court asked,
"[h]ow then can sexual harassment, which injects the most
demeaning sexual stereotypes into the general work environment
and which always represents an intentional assault on an individ-
ual's innermost privacy, not be illegal? 2 2 This question placed
"beyond serious dispute"" the proposition that sexual harassment,
standing alone, poisons the atmosphere of employment.
Not content with expanding the contours of liability set out in
Barnes, the court of appeals in Bundy suggested, in exquisite de-
tail, the form that injunctive relief should take in Sandra Bundy's
case. The recommended order of injunction included a definition
of sexual harassment 4 and requirements that the agency employer
notify all its employees that sexual harassment was discriminatory.
It also instituted procedures for hearing complaints of sexual har-
assment, and developed sanctions for supervisors and other em-
ployees who sexually harass female employees. 6
Moreover, in its remand to the district court on the issue of
Sandra Bundy's back pay, the court set forth a new test for Title
VII burdens of proof. Specifically, in cases of sexual harassment,
the burden of proof resting on the plaintiff is much less than on
other Title VII plaintiffs; the burden of proof on the defendant is
much heavier.' Sandra Bundy established her prima facie case of
loss of promotion simply by showing sexual harassment and that
she applied for and was denied promotion when she was techni-
cally eligible. She did not have to show that her employer had pro-
moted unharassed employees with the same qualifications. The
court of appeals instructed the district court to determine whether
the defendant could show, not by a preponderance of the evidence,
20. Id.
21. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977); Gray
v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. City of Buffalo,
457 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Steadman v. Hundley, 421 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
22. 641 F.2d at 945.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 947-48.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 951-53. Normally, the plaintiff must show, as part of her prima facie case,
that the employer promoted other employees in the same group as the plaintiff at about the
same time as he failed to promote the plaintiff. The traditional burden of proof on the
defendant is that he must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he had legitimate
reasons for failing to promote the employee.
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but by clear and convincing evidence, that he had not promoted
Sandra Bundy because she could not meet the stringent qualifica-
tion criteria that promoted employees had met.27
Why did the court go so far to protect Sandra Bundy? The
court reasoned that unless it extended the Barnes holding, "an em-
ployer could sexually harass a female employee with impunity by
carefully stopping short of firing the employee or taking any other
tangible actions against her in response to her resistance ... "
Thus, an employer could make his employee's endurance of sexual
intimidation a "condition" of her employment while creating the
false impression that he did not take the ritual of harassment and
resistance seriously enough to retaliate against her.
The Bundy decision may trigger varying interpretations. Ei-
ther the court contributed to social awareness by squarely con-
fronting sexual harassment, or it overstepped its bounds by med-
dling in human relationships. Whether the Rogers concept of a
discriminatory work environment includes sexual harassment, or
the Bundy court unjustifiably extended Barnes, will determine the
future impact of the Bundy decision. The prospect for Supreme
Court review of Bundy will increase if the Court perceives the de-
cision as essentially a radical departure from settled principle.
Although the result in Bundy follows logically from the Rogers
court's recognition of claims of subtle and pervasive forms of dis-
crimination, Bundy presents a unique fact-finding problem for Ti-
tle VII litigation. Distinguishing between a male employer's be-
nign, complimentary attention to female employees and a subtle
but illegal sexual imposition is difficult. Additionally, in light of
the pervasiveness of such conduct, the eradication of sexual impo-
sitions from the work environment is no small endeavor for Con-
gress or the courts.
Unlike Barnes, which tied the existence of actionable sexual
harassment to traditional modes of employment, Bundy so ex-
pands the standard of liability that offensive sexual propositions
made to a female employee, without more, constitute a violation of
Title VII. The court's statement that sexual harassment "always
represents an intentional assault on an individual's innermost pri-
vacy"2 9 fails to acknowledge that the offensive behavior sometimes
is merely thoughtless, the product of social and cultural condition-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 945.
29. Id.
19811
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ing. Under the Bundy rationale, a male employer must exercise ex-
treme caution when expressing an interest in a female employee, to
avoid an illegal (even if unintended) imposition upon the woman's
privacy.
The Bundy court, however, did qualify the application of its
expanded standard, lest casual conversation fall under the um-
brella of Title VII liability. The court noted that "casual or iso-
lated manifestations of a discriminatory environment, such as a
few ethnic or racial slurs, may not raise a cause of action."' 0 The
illegality of the conduct depends on its constituting "a practice of
sexual harassment." 81 The pervasiveness of the practice, however,
is not a mitigating factor that would render otherwise discrimina-
tory conduct legal.8"
Yet much of society assumes, as the district courts in Barnes
and Bundy did, that sexual harassment in its milder forms is just a
normal working condition, not Title VII discrimination. Although
the government and courts have acted in concert to eradicate har-
assment and intimidation of readily identifiable racial and ethnic
minorities in the workplace, the sheer number of women precludes
their classification as a minority group. Conceivably, the more ten-
uous legal status of women in our society contributes to cultural
tolerance of sexual harassment. An alternative explanation for the
tolerance of sexual harassment is that an entrenched cultural atti-
tude of male superiority and domination pervades employment re-
lationships. The Bundy court expressly noted that "so long as wo-
men remain inferiors in the employment hierarchy, they may have
little recourse against harassment beyond the legal recourse Bundy
seeks in this case.""3
Indeed, the dissenting opinion in Carroll v. Talman Savings &
Loan Associations4 reflects how society may diminish an affront to
a woman to an "emotional complaint of one disgruntled em-
ployee."36 In Carroll, the Seventh Circuit upheld the claim that an
employer's policy requiring female employees to wear uniforms
and male employees to wear ordinary business clothes violated Ti-
tle VII. Judge Pell's dissent characterized the majority opinion as
30. Id. at 943 n.9 (citing Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87,
88 (8th Cir. 1977); Felete v. United States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177, 1186 (W.D. Pa.
1973)); see Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1977).
31. 641 F.2d at 946.
32. Id. at 939, 942.
33. Id. at 945.
34. 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979) (Pell, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 1034.
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an encroachment by "Big Brother-or perhaps in this case Big Sis-
ter.""6 He further contended that the majority opinion would rein-
force the fear expressed by opponents of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment of "extreme applications bordering on the ridiculous when no
meaningful discrimination exists.
'8 7
For all its shortcomings, the Bundy decision represents a cou-
rageous attempt by a court to resolve some of the sexual inequities
in a female employee's work environment. Some commentators
may criticize Bundy for dealing with a complex human issue under
the guise of Title VII. Bundy, however, did not depart from prece-
dent; it merely extended precedent to achieve a laudable result for
the Sandra Bundys of the world. The ultimate question is whether
the legal principle set forth in Bundy runs too far ahead of the
nation's social conscience.
Satz v. Perlmutter: A Constitutional Right to
Die?
Abe Perlmutter was a seventy-three year old patient, termi-
nally ill. He sought judicial approval of his. decision to discontinue
extraordinary, life-sustaining medical treatment.1 Perlmutter suf-
fered from amytrophic lateral sclerosis,' an incurable disease for
which the normal life expectancy following diagnosis is two years.
In his case, the disease had progressed to the point where he had
only a few months to live and could not breathe without the aid of
a mechanical respirator. Every movement caused him excruciating
36. Id. at 1033.
37. Id. at 1038.
1. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), afl'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980). Extraordinary treatment is commonly defined as "all medicines, treatments and oper-
ations which can't be obtained or used without excessive expense, pain or other inconven-
ience, or which if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit." Louisell, Euthanasia
and Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing, 20 CATH. U.L. REv. 723, 736 (1973); see In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 21, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (1976), in which the court noted that "one would
have to think that the use of the same respirator or life-support could be considered 'ordi-
nary' in the context of the possibly curable patient but 'extraordinary' in the context of...
an irreversibly doomed patient."
2. Amytrophic lateral sclerosis, commonly known as Lou Gehrig's disease, is a degener-
ative disease of the neurological system, characterized by increasing paralysis. It inevitably
results in death within three years. See generally HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 1834, 1845 (7th ed. 1974).
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